Maritime Security – Greenwich Maritime Centre

South Africa’s Engagement in Counter-Piracy as a Foreign Policy Decision

By Lisa Otto

South Africa became involved as a counter-piracy actor rather late in the day, after repeated calls for it to make a contribution to the scourge that was then facing the continent – Somali piracy. Despite the rise of the Somali pirate problem coming in 2007, it was not until the outward ‘ballooning’ effect of the pirates’ reach began to extend southwards towards the Mozambican Channel, that South Africa’s interest was suitably piqued.

In December 2010 Somali pirates struck off Mozambique’s coast, and the South African Department of Defence responded to this attack on its immediate neighbour by deploying warships to Mozambique. This effort was known as Operation Copper and constituted the very beginning of South Africa’s engagement in counter-piracy efforts beyond endeavours of verbal condemnation.

Not acting on its own recognisance, but rather generously acquiescing to Mozambique’s request for assistance, piracy was suddenly thrust from the periphery of South Africa’s international agenda to a more central position than it previously enjoyed. Albeit one that did yet not necessarily beget much strategic priority.

In February 2012, South Africa’s engagement in counter-piracy became formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding signed in partnership with Mozambique and Tanzania, under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Subsequently the countries have seen some success, notably in April 2012 when the partnership was put to use to fend off a pirate attack in Tanzanian waters, in collaboration with the European Union (EU) deployment.

Beyond this, Operation Copper has also worked at training efforts as a capacity-building mechanism with neighbouring countries. More recently, South Africa has begun to focus its attentions the Gulf of Guinea also, with the navy being active there in the last two years.

At the time of South Africa’s entrance as an actor in the counter piracy environment, maritime piracy in Somalia had been a problem of global concern for some years. By 2011 this experience had led to a number of experts alluding to the emergence of a new hotspot for Somali pirates in Southern African waters. Given pirates’ dynamic nature and ability to adapt to the challenges they faced, the presence of international forces in the Gulf of Aden would force pirates further south in pursuance of their victims. The trend known as ballooning saw Somali pirates venture far afield.

It was this thinking that underpinned a theory that Southern Africa would soon face dealing with the pirate scourge. This notion, coupled with the need for security in the maritime domain in light of resource discoveries off the coast of Tanzania and Mozambique as well as the active ports at Dar es Salaam, Beira and Maputo seemed to necessitate action. This, along with the successful pirate attacks in Mozambican waters in 2010, the threat must have seemed quite real to South Africa, and potentially also posed a risk to its interests off Southern Africa’s eastern coastline.

Yet, the Somali pirate scourge dwindled significantly in 2012 and 2013 as a number of activities and developments both on land and at sea paid off. Beyond this, Somali pirates have not managed to sustain their campaign further into the Indian Ocean, and ultimately southwards, given logistical challenges. The absence of a safe haven outside Somalia, as well as having to go without the intricate support network in Somalia that provide the very foundations for their activities worsens matters. Establishing new such networks (which would require an environment devoid of effective governance comparable to the erstwhile Somalia) is a task more difficult in the Southern African region given its comparative condition of peace and security. Another option would be the use of a mother ship based in international waters, but this too would require access to a regular supply of food, water, fuel and other items, usually provided by on-shore networks contracted by pirate groups.

Given this and the limited defence budget in South Africa, it may seem curious that the country committed of its limited naval assets to these endeavours. In fact, the allocation to Operation Copper alone in the 2013 budget was R585 million (US$56 million) from a total annual budget of R40 billion (or US$3.9 billion).

Says defence analyst Helmoed Heitman, “either South Africa accepts regional security responsibilities and funds an appropriate defence force, or we wind our neck in, keep quiet and hope nothing goes wrong”. He posits that despite the role of a defence force being to address threats, the budget leaves no room for this, nor for the unexpected. Thus, one might conclude that the expenditure on counter-piracy operations is a frivolous expense, given the state’s primary responsibility of protecting its territory – a place to which pirates have yet to venture. Others may argue that the fact that pirates have not entered South African waters is credit to the capabilities of the navy.

On the balance of this information, how pragmatic is South Africa’s engagement in counter-piracy? Is it a worthy exercise in foreign policy, employing foresight, or does it constitute funds misspent on threat not immediately real to South Africa?

While Heitman makes apt observations with respect to the military budget, it is worth noting that South Africa’s security apparatus are most often deployed in assistance of other nations, often in Africa. South Africa does not fear any immediate threat to its territory, and is therefore able to make use of its defence forces as a tool in the furtherance of its foreign policy objectives, key amongst which is the precedence of Africa.

The fear of pirates’ southward migration offered Pretoria the opportunity to participate through its region in keeping with the country’s foreign policy and the practice of engaging the region as a first port of call. A SADC-based initiative would also be consistent with the African Agenda and the ideal of ensuring that the collective security of the Southern African neighbourhood is safeguarded. These considerations serve to motivate the pursuance of the issue in a way that befits South Africa’s model of foreign policy quite perfectly.

Counter-piracy activities have also allowed South Africa to push back at pirate frontiers farther away from home, effectively assisting neighbours through collaborative efforts, all the while, keeping the trouble at a safe distance from South Africa’s doorstep. This may be considered a pragmatic policy decision – indeed, South Africa is a littoral state with 3,751km of coast line, dotted along which sit a number of crucially important ports with significance not just for South African but for the region as a whole.

Given South Africa’s status as an emerging nation, it also has globalised interests, being impacted by costs brought on by piracy on the global economy, as well as the domestic concerns felt by neighbours. Furthermore, it acts to bolster South Africa’s perceived involvement in a fashionable issue of international proportions, without requiring all too much effort on the part of Pretoria. This too falls squarely in line with South Africa’s implied foreign policy objective of being the foremost African actor participating in the international space – the go-to partner on the continent who leads by example where issues of African security are concerned.

In conclusion, while the cost of South Africa’s counter-piracy engagement may, on the face of it, not appear to equal its benefit, South Africa has managed to structure this engagement in a way that plays to the global image that it works to portray, while expending relatively little resources. From a practical point of view the cost does not seem to meet the minimal realities of its risk, but perhaps in this instance South Africa has made its play on the basis of strategy rather than economics.

Is it necessary for its own security to be actively fighting the pirate threat? No, it is not. But, given the transnational nature of the crime, and nondiscriminatory nature of its effects, it is of crucial importance that states, littoral and landlocked become involved, acknowledge a shared responsibility and tackle the crime as a collective. Experts have long held that a coordinated effort by the international community is needed to turn the tide in the fight against piracy. This is South Africa’s effort to do just that – in this case a responsible global actor, but primarily one taking a path of pragmatic foreign policy.

A version of this article was first published in the African Armed Forces Journal in November 2014 as a winning entry of the AAFJ Denel writing competition, and the full version may be accessed there.

Role of robots in maritime search and rescue explored

Robots and autonomous underwater vehicles are playing an increasing role in commercial maritime and offshore oil and gas operations for such things as oil and gas exploration, subsea work, repairs and maintenance, and hull inspections. The future will usher in an expanded role for robots and unmanned vehicles. DNV GL, for example, recently unveiled a concept vessel for short sea shipping called the ReVolt that is fully battery powered and unmanned.

The NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), part of the NATO Science and Technology Organization, recently held sea trials that successfully tested and demonstrated the integration of robotic platforms, including Unmanned Surface Vehicles and Unmanned Aerial Systems for Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. The sea trials, from October 13 to 24, were held as part of ICARUS (Integrated Components for Assisted Rescue and Unmanned Search operations) project, which is funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP7).

Since 2012, ICARUS has been developing advanced robotic platforms that can support crisis intervention teams in detecting, locating and rescuing humans in danger, in maritime and land disaster scenarios.

Unmanned Search and Rescue (SAR) devices offer a valuable tool for saving lives and for speeding SAR operations.

This is crucial for maritime incidents where survival times are short and SAR teams can be exposed to considerable risks.

For such events, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), capable of transporting SAR equipment and deploying first aid devices, can greatly improve the efficiency of operations.

Existing technologies have been improved to strengthen resilience, and new developments include robotic vehicles that can deploy autonomous life saving capsules, using mission planning software, new sensors and new data acquisition capabilities to detect and track survivors.

Experts in maritime robotics and target recognition, CMRE is collaborating with the Laboratory of Microgrids and Electric Vehicles, Portugal, in the framework of ICARUS to enhance the autonomy of robotic surface vehicles and is also involved in the integration of the main USV into the ICARUS Command, Control and Interface (C2I) station collaborative operations with aerial robots.

The ICARUS project is managed by a consortium of 24 public and private partners from 10 countries.

One of the central objectives of the project is to bridge the gap between robotic laboratories and the application of novel robotic devices to real-life situations in the field, paving the way for cutting-edge technologies to be used in Search and Rescue operations.

In 2015, the technologies developed during the ICARUS project will be tested in two scenarios, one a simulated earthquake exercise in Belgium and the other a maritime accident in Portugal.

Source – www.marinelog.com

Maritime piracy: Why definitions matter

Lisa Otto

Industry stakeholders and government officials from various countries met in London on 23 and 24 September to discuss maritime piracy in in West Africa under an inative organised by the America-based Oceans Beyond Piracy. With piratical act in the Gulf of Guinea rendering these waters some of the most dangerous in the world, threatening economic and security imperatives in the region of geostratefic importance; this issue was the focus of the discussion.

Following the meetings, in a conversation with one government official in attendance, the question of defining piracy was raised and the wide range of definitions varying in scope were highlighted. It was, however, decided that these interpretations had sufficient commonality for any fine -tuning to be set aside.

This, in my opinion, is an oversight and one that challenges how the problem may be approached. To provide background here, it is worth noting how piracy is defined, and why events in West Africa occur on the periphery of this definition.

International law under Article 101 of the United Nations Law of the Sea of 1982 holds that piracy is any violence, detention or depredation that take place on the high seas, is perpetrated for private gain, and gain, and occurs between at least two vessels. Much of this definition is based on law used to combat piracy during the so -called golden age in the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as an interpretation emanating for the Harvard Draft, compiled by academics in 1932.

In West Africa acts of piracy predominately take place in territorial waters, and have been perpetrated for motives that enmesh private gain, through organised criminal activity, with political grounds and forms of protest. On this basis, and unless expressly defined as piracy under the domestic law of the country in whose waters these acts take place, the internationally accepted definition can really not be applied here. In short, the use of the word piracy to describe these acts is mostly inaccurate and constitutes a misnomer. Nonetheless, scholars, government institutions, oil majors and shipping companies tend to refer to acts of robbery- at – sea and associated crimes as piracy, often for ease of reference.

While this approach make the phenomenon perhaps easier to categorize, what it fails to acknowledge is that the acts in West African waters present distinct model of piracy, which, although having similarities to other manifestations of the phenomenon, presents itself in a unique way. Of course, the word that we used to describe things are of utmost importance because they inform the way in which we understand them, and also often attach automatic assumptions and expectations. The key to being able to address piracy successfully is then in understanding differences within the phenomenon and appreciating the idiosyncrasies at play in various maritime domains.

Questions of piracy are further complicated by a dearth of domestic legislation in affected West African countries, which stems from sea-blindness- the failure to appreciate the sea as a political and economic domain that requires securitising. Not only does a legal framework often not exist under which prosecutions can take place, the lack of such framework underscore a shortfall in understanding amongst the various officials whose job it now becomes to tackle maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Moreover, the international definition is this also inadequate to serve as guidance for these countries in building their own understanding and addressing piratical acts in their territorial waters.

As this is a problem that is affecting numerous countries within the Gulf in Guinea sub- region (although mainly emanating from Nigeria), states are also likely to take different routes to solving this definitional problem when attempting to construct framework for countering piracy . While there is a regional appetite for cooperation amongst states, this may in itself present a stumbling block in what routes regional platforms may have for their collective security.

There is an impression that due to the difficult nature of the task of fine- tuning definitions to be more inclusive of various manifestations of piracy, alongside the struggle in achieving consensus, it is considered too onerous a task, and one for which attendees at these September meetings simply did not have the enthusiasm.

The question of definition may seem a minor element of the issue at hand and consideration of being clearer on the words we use may be considered trivial, but is it important that there at least be some attempt at getting these basics right – once an understanding on what the problem, and could present an opportunity for streamlining of definition and method, bolstering a coppertative approach, which will go a long way towards achieving a shared vision on immediate and long- term actions to be taken.

Nigeria and Piracy: the Evolution of a Complex Problem; A seminar by Lisa Otto

Hosted by Lisa Otto

Biography

Lisa Otto holds a MA in International Peace and Security from King’s College London’s War Studies Department, which she achieved with Distinction, as well as BA and BA Honours degrees from the University of Johannesburg. She is now pursuing doctoral studies in Politics under the auspices of the SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy. and is currently conducting visiting research at the GMI. Her doctoral study investigates the evolution of maritime piracy in Nigeria.

Lisa’s research interests include non-traditional threats to security, particularly in Africa, as well as African foreign policy and engagement at the regional and international levels. Before returning to UJ to begin her doctorate, Lisa worked with the Institute for Security Studies and the South African Institute of International Affairs. She has also worked on projects with Transparency International, the African Union, Corruption Watch, and the European Commission, and has conducted field research in Finland, South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

Topic

Nigeria and Piracy: the Evolution of a Complex Problem

Abstract:

While piracy is certainly not a new predicament off West Africa’s coast, it is one that has certainly become more punctuated in recent years, particularly off the shores of Nigeria. Piracy there challenges our traditional understanding of the crime, taking on a more domestic nature, and one that tends to centre on the region’s thriving oil industry. It is with the legacy of this industry too that it finds its origins, which, enmeshed with defining features of the Nigerian state (corruption, neo-patrimonialism, poverty, and criminality), has come to pose a significant threat to economic and security imperatives in Nigeria and the sub-region. Actors tasked with tackling the phenomenon have been implicated in the crime itself, rendering it an exceedingly complex problem to solve. This presentation will unpack the nature of piracy in Nigeria (and by extension West Africa), offering insight into underlying causal factors of the crime, how it plays out on these troubled waters, and what efforts are being taken to bring it to an end.

For more information on getting to the venue click here

The World International Studies Conference – summary report

By Lisa Otto

Visiting Researcher – Greenwich Maritime Institute

D.Phil Candidate – University of Johannesburg

The World International Studies Conference, convened 6 – 9 August at the Goethe University in Frankfurt hosted a maritime security panel series, entitled Maritime Securityscapes. This saw three panels and two roundtables discussing a variety of maritime issues.

The three maritime security panels comprised discussions on contemporary piracy, non-state actors in maritime security, and the securitisation of the maritime; while the two roundtables discussed lessons from the Contact Group on Piracy and off the Coast of Somalia, and the future of maritime security studies.

This initiative has been to the great credit of Christian Beuger of Cardiff University (and formerly of the GMI), who put in a lot of work to propose, put together and coordinate this panel series, effectively bringing together the small but flourishing group of researchers in the field of maritime security studies.

Lisa Otto, a visiting researcher at GMI who attended the conference and presented a paper there, now offers a snapshot of some of the interesting discussions made on the various maritime security panels.

* * *

Lessons from the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia:

This roundtable was perhaps one of the more interesting discussions had by maritime security experts in attendance and discussed the successes and failures of the CGPCS and interrogated whether there were opportunities to transfer lessons learned to address piracy in other regional contexts.

The CGPCS was established to address a finite problem, and came about in response to inertia or slow-moving responses to the piracy problem off the Somali coast. Given United Nations resolutions on the matter, the scope was there for the creation of such a body, essentially legitimised by the United Nations.

The discussants agreed that the CGPCS’ successes came primarily as a result of its limited geographic and sectoral focus, and the informal nature of its structure, engaging a large number of state and non-state stakeholders. This meant few barriers to entry for stakeholders, limited red tape, all the while granting ownership and legitimacy to this uncommon exercise in global governance in the eyes of the 600+ stakeholders involved.

These, however, are also described as being the characteristics responsible for the Contact Group’s weaknesses, as large membership created a duplication of efforts.

Nonetheless, several positive outcomes resulted from the CGPCS including shared awareness between multi-national forces present in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the Best Management Practices manual, the maritime security centre for the Horn of Africa, and multi-national agreements for prosecution.

Currently, questions abound regarding what to do with the mechanism now that piracy off the coast of Somalia has declined dramatically in recent years. Speakers noted that pirates may still be present in Somalia, albeit dormant at present, which raises the risk for a great resurgence of piracy there should naval forces present there leave.

One suggestion put forward, was the establishment of a small secretariat that could act as a meeting point for stakeholders, which could convene when necessary to address threats and concerns related to maritime security, and sea piracy in particular. Furthermore, capacities will need to be transitioned, such that functions currently performed by international partners may be taken over by local institutions, who are then supported in their efforts by these partners.

As for the transferability of idea and template of the CGPCS, discussants and participants noted that lessons and successes in this instance are not likely to be applicable in other geographical settings where piracy currently presents a problem to the differing contexts in which they occur. In Somalia, one was dealing with a failed state and a threat within international waters, which thus rendered the issues within the remit of the international community to respond to. In other regions of the world, West Africa for example, the breadth of piracy crosses the waters of various territories, affecting states that may be weak but are certainly not failed. Furthermore, in this instance, the threat does not emanate from the high seas but from territorial waters, placing the concern under the jurisdiction of individual sovereign states rather than the international community.

Ultimately, while the initiative of the CGPCS has been widely considered as a success, it seems that this is unlikely to be duplicated in other contexts.

* * *

Look out for further installments this week for more insight into current debates in maritime security studies, as discussed at the WISC Conference.

Royal Navy HMS Enterprise takes Britons from Libya to Malta

The Royal Navy is preparing to help British citizens leave Libya as continued fighting and gunfire at Tripoli’s airport kills 22.

The Libyan interim government said “heavily armed groups” have shelled “civilian targets”, putting thousands of citizens in danger and displacing hundreds of families.

The Foreign Office has advised British people to leave the country immediately and is temporarily closing its embassy in Tripoli.

The MOD said the government was helping to “provide assisted departure for a number of UK nationals”.

BBC political correspondent Chris Mason said: “I’m told the number of British nationals in the country is not huge – it is in the hundreds, rather than the thousands. Commercial routes to leave the country are still open.

“The Foreign Office has already announced that it will suspend the operations of its embassy in Tripoli after fighting in the capital intensified, including near the embassy building itself.

“But I’m told staff at the embassy are yet to leave – as they have been supervising the evacuation of those Britons who want to leave.”

In a statement, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) said: “As the FCO has made clear, the UK government will provide assisted departure for a number of UK nationals before suspending consular operations on Monday.”

The latest casualties in the fighting has claimed more than 200 lives in recent weeks, with 72 people wounded in Saturday’s violent skirmishes.

The fighting on Saturday came as more than three-quarters of Libya’s newly elected parliament met for the first time in Tobrouk, a city near the Egyptian border chosen by a prominent anti-Islamist politician, according to an AP report. Political experts believe this signals a swing against Islamist parties and extremist militias.

The violence across Libya has led to the closure of several foreign missions and the withdrawal of diplomats.

On Saturday, a Greek naval frigate evacuated embassy staff and nearly 200 citizens from Greece, China and other countries from Libya.

Maritime Piracy in West Africa – A Big Problem, Poorly Reported

By Lisa Otto

Visiting Researcher – Greenwich Maritime Institute

D.Phil Candidate – University of Johannesburg

The problem of maritime piracy in West Africa has grown significantly in recent years such that it has come to constitute the world’s most troubling piratical hotspot, with incidents occurring across the Gulf of Guinea region. According to the UK Chamber of Shipping, incidents climbed to 62 in 2012 while coming in at 51 in 2013, and this as the European Union Institute for Security Studies estimates that only a third of pirate attacks were reported, suggesting that the breadth of the problem may be far greater than we imagine.

The word piracy, however, is a bit of a misnomer in the West African case as the model of piracy at play targets vessels within territorial waters rather than on the high seas, revolving around the sub-region’s oil industry, but has all the same gained the moniker of ‘petro-piracy’. As such, this model is glaringly distinguishable from its more famous Somali counterpart, which is perhaps one of the reasons that legal expert Douglas Guilfoyle, for one, has preferred to refer to ‘piracies’ rather than the more generalist ‘piracy’.

Indeed, the Gulf of Guinea model of piracy is unique in its focus on oil, with kidnap-for-ransom being conducted as more of a side-business than being the main slant of operations. The vast majority of attacks have emanated from Nigeria, where small and opportunistic gangs initially robbed berthed vessels of personal effects and money, which were then resold at local markets, but since then, incidents have become more frequent, have been perpetrated by larger groups and shifted to be directed specifically toward the oil industry.

The legacy of oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in particular has had an important role to play in the rise of petro-piracy as environmental degradation further marginalised communities already bereft of economic opportunities, in the context of a social development landscape where oil rents have not made their way back to the populace in the form of political goods. This has driven locals to organised criminal groups and sent them to sea for the theft of oil products, contributed to by large-scale onshore oil bunkering operations that thieve approximately 200,000 barrels of oil per day. In fact, the Nigerian economy loses around US$12 billion in oil annually as a result, with the illicit product, sometimes crudely refined, making its way into sub-regional and international markets.

Despite the sheer scale of these activities, West African piracy does not enjoy nearly as much media coverage or academic attention as its erstwhile Somali counterpart. Perhaps oil theft and petro-piracy is not as ‘sexy’ to report on than Hollywood-worthy Captain Phillips-esque hostage sagas, but the phenomenon nonetheless presents a sizeable economic and security challenge whose impacts reach far beyond Nigerian shores.

This, of course, has consequences for the application of solutions to the problem, as poor reportage may impact upon the will of potential partners to act. Having said this however, several instruments for the combat of piracy are in place at a sub-regional level, assisted by the likes of the International Maritime Ogranisation, but need greater impetus for their application.

This is not helped by the alarming prevalence of corruption in Nigeria, with political and military officials, as well as even oil companies being implicated and involved in these crimes, effectively benefiting from competing interests on either side of formal – informal and legal – illegal divides. Whilst these issues speak to more complex and deeply entrenched maladies of the country’s political fabric which need solving in their right, greater awareness of the problem of maritime piracy in West African can play a crucial role in mounting public pressure to fight against the tide of petro-piracy there, and spur a greater sense of willingness for action amongst actors locally, those in the sub-region as well as their partners in the international community.

Merchant Vessels warned to beware hire of Armed Guards against pirates

Serious Flaws in Security as Nigerian Factions Squabble Over Primacy

NIGERIA – The situation with regard to piracy, hijackings and theft of all types from freight and passenger vessels and particularly those concerned with energy extraction, transiting the waters off the country’s coast is already dangerous and confused enough without an element of political infighting and the confusion which has arisen when personnel from different branches of local law enforcement have clashed over who has primacy on the open sea. Last October a skiff approaching a Romanian owned oil tanker was fired on by the Nigerian police security team aboard which believed it to be manned by a pirate group. The boat actually contained a Nigerian Naval patrol which drove the shooters into the vessel’s citadel from which they were later extracted and arrested.

This is just one of many similar incidents which have arisen as confusion over where geographical jurisdiction starts and finishes is made more difficult by ‘private’ security escort arrangements with officials made by shady middle men. Certainly the Nigerian Navy seemingly has charge of matters in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) an area extending up to 200 nautical miles seawards from the coasts of Nigeria within which the country’s authorities reserve the right to regulate by law any and all actions which they see fit.

The problem is, which authorities? The Navy also has powers extending to inshore waters when acting as part of the Niger Delta Joint Task Force whilst the Nigerian Maritime Safety Agency (NIMASA), also seems to claim some interest in anything occurring within the EEZ.

NIMASA is run by Mr. Ziakede P. Akpobolokemi, whose current agency is allegedly linked to Government Ekpemupolo, poacher turned gamekeeper and the billionaire who was formerly a commander (and alleged military quartermaster) of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) who now, after receiving amnesty five years ago, is alleged to be the power behind Global West Vessel Specialist Ltd. which offers security surveillance in the EEZ acting for NIMASA.

NIMASA in turn is linked to the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) which says it collaborates closely with other government security agencies, namely the Marine Police and the Nigerian Navy, to regularly patrol and provide air surveillance for water fronts and river channels to battle the menace of piracy in and around the country’s ports. In addition, the port management department says it provides high speed patrol boats to assist the ‘security agencies’ in their patrols and surveillance.

It seems ‘arrangements’ have been made with all and sundry to protect private shipping, a job many have proved woefully inadequate at, with Nigerian Maritime Police being hired out under ‘private’ contracts only to be subsequently arrested and detained by the Navy which has been charged by new leadership to clean up the whole scene.

One of the groups most affected by the disastrous security situation in the region are the members of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) which is currently seeking written confirmation from the Nigerian authorities of how it sees the situation. The BIMCO view is explained fully in a recent statement to its members which reads:

“BIMCO members operating vessels within the Nigerian EEZ and territorial waters should be aware that they may be at risk of potentially significant liabilities and delays if they employ armed guards on board their vessels who are sourced from the Nigerian Marine Police, the Nigerian Police or the Joint Task Force (JTF). The Nigerian Navy only provides vessel escorts and it is understood to have sole primacy and authority in territorial waters and the EEZ, BIMCO has been advised that the Nigerian Navy does not provide or permit armed guards on merchant vessels.

“The Navy has seemingly begun enforcing its alleged authority to prevent the employment of armed guards on board and this has resulted in the arrest of members of the Nigerian Marine Police and consequent delays to the vessel and unresolved liabilities placed on the owners. This appears to apply regardless of whether the armed guard policemen are sourced by an agent or a private military security company (PMSC).

“There have also been reports of incidents of ‘blue on blue’ where policemen have opened fire on Nigerian Naval vessels believing they were pirates and where seafarers have been killed or injured in the crossfire. Apparently, the Marine Police and Police only have primacy and jurisdiction in ‘riverine’ areas and ports and harbours out to the fairway buoy and no further.

“The JTF against terrorists, is a combined task force of navy and police, with a specific role to counter oil theft and smuggling in the Delta. The JTF is understood to have no jurisdiction outside this remit. The transit of supply vessels up the Bonny River to Port Harcourt is arranged by the JTF and these ships go in convoys (for a charge) whilst the offshore oil export Terminals are patrolled by private security units or the Nigerian Navy.

“It would seem that the only legitimate method of acquiring armed security protection in territorial waters and the EEZ of Nigeria is by utilising the services of the Nigerian Navy (although, this seems to exclude armed guards on board vessels).”

Sourced – /www.handyshippingguide.com/

Shocking report into the Asian slave labour producing prawns for supermarkets in US, UK

A six-month investigation has established that large numbers of men bought and sold like animals and held against their will on fishing boats off Thailand are integral to the production of prawns (commonly called shrimp in the US) sold in leading supermarket around the world, including the top four global retailers: Walmart, Carrefour, Costco and Tesco.

The investigation found that the world’s largest prawn farmer, the Thailand-based Chareon Pokphand (CP) Foods, buys fishmeal, which it feeds to its farmed prawns, from some suppliers that own, operate or buy from fishing boats manned with slaves.

Men who have managed to escape from boats supplying CP Foods and other companies like it told the Guardian of horrific conditions, including 20-hour shifts, regular beatings, torture and execution-style killings. Some were at sea for years; some were regularly offered methamphetamines to keep them going. Some had seen fellow slaves murdered in front of them.

More details on this shocking report can be found on the Guardian’s website

The facts

Thailand produces roughly 4.2m tonnes of seafood every year, 90% of which is destined for export, official figures show. The US, UK and EU are prime buyers of this seafood – with Americans buying half of all Thailand’s seafood exports and the UK alone consuming nearly 7% of all Thailand’s prawn exports.

“The use of trafficked labour is systematic in the Thai fishing industry,” says Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, who describes a “predatory relationship” between these migrant workers and the captains who buy them.

“The industry would have a hard time operating in its current form without it.”

Below is the process which demonstrates how slaves are being used to produce prawns to your plate:

From this report it is clear to see how, as consumers, we need to be aware when buying prawns from the mentioned retailers, we should be more conscious on how this has arrived at this outlet and if indeed there are alternative outlets we can use to avoid using these poor slaves in the production.

The art of teaching war – public lecture at the University of Greenwich

How do you force someone to fight for you – to go to war? This and other questions will be addressed at a free public lecture by a military expert and University of Greenwich academic.

Professor Chris Bellamy is Director of the university’s Greenwich Maritime Institute, in the Faculty of Architecture, Construction & Humanities. An award-winning author and former defence correspondent at The Independent, Chris is also an expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union. His views have been widely sought by media over the current tensions between Russia and Ukraine.

Don’t try this at home…: Teaching War, 400 BC to the present takes place at the university’s Greenwich Campus on Tuesday 22 July 2014 at 6pm.

Chris says: “Warfare – the use of violence for political ends – is as old as recorded history and, some would argue, is the ‘dark side of civilisation’. Warfare requires communities organised on some scale and a measure of authority to force people to participate in an exhausting, terrifying, arduous and often tedious activity which runs against many of our natural instincts.

“From the beginnings of recorded civilisation the communities most successful in armed conflict triumphed through better organisation, equipment, training, tactics, and the conceptual component – an intellectual understanding of the nature and processes of warfare. To win in battle, and in warfare more generally, training and education are key.”

Technology, technique and science all feature strongly in the history of war. Examples developed and explored by Chris during his 13 years as a teacher at the Defence Academy of the UK at Shrivenham reveal that, until relatively recently, one combatant seldom had a decisive technological edge over another. It was discipline, training and technique– how they used it – that determined success.

Chris has taught these ideas to students, including many serving members of the armed forces, for many years. He will present a number of case studies, including analysis of the leap from mechanical energy – bows and arrows and catapults, to chemical energy – guns and rockets. Chris will also discuss the importance of indirect fire – artillery firing at targets which those manning the guns cannot see.

Without this development in technique the First World War, the start of which is being commemorated this year, could not have happened as it did. Yet very few historians understand what indirect fire is, or mention its decisive role in shaping the fighting on land, particularly on the Western front.

Don’t try this at home…: Teaching War, 400 BC to the present. University of Greenwich Maritime Institute, presented with the Centre for the Study of Play and Recreation. Tuesday 22 July 2014, 6pm until 7.30 pm. Room 080, Queen Anne Court, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, SE10, 9LS. To be followed by a wine reception.

All are welcome to this free lecture but to book a place for the wine reception, please contact the Greenwich Maritime Institute on gmi@gre.ac.uk.

This lecture precedes the 36th Annual Conference of the International Standing Committee for the History of Education, Education, War and Peace, to be held at the Institute of Education, University of London, 23–26 July 2014.

Mary Clare Martin, Ewa Sidorenko and Leticia Fernandez-Fontecha Rumeu, of the Department of Education and Community Studies, will be speaking on a panel at the ISCHE conference, entitled Survival, Pain and Memory: recovering experiences of war, peace and education in Spain, Poland, Gibraltar and Britain, 1902-1950.